Turkey Before and After Ataturk by Sylvia Kedourie

Author:Sylvia Kedourie [Kedourie, Sylvia]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780714680064
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Published: 1999-01-31T00:00:00+00:00

From the Ottoman Empire's point of view Bulgaria's independence crisis entailed direct threats to Ottoman security. Naturally enough, for the duration of the crisis, Ottoman attention focused primarily on Bulgarian military movements. Like other governments, the Ottoman Empire was taken by surprise by Bulgaria's declaration of independence. Its unpreparedness was reinforced by the fact that it possessed a new regime which had just come to power as the result of a revolution, a regime, furthermore, which consisted of an uneasy coalition between the CUP, on the one hand, and a cabinet of old regime figures led by Kâmil Pasha, on the other. The new regime had had no time to formulate a clear foreign policy before the crisis overtook it. Kâmil Pasha had brought to office a deep pessimism on the subject of the Empire's relations with Bulgaria. For its part, the CUP had brought with it an anti-Europeanism expressed in a determination to reassert the Empire's independence and dignity in the face of the European Great Powers, and perhaps, too, hopes of reaching a lasting accommodation with Bulgaria. But none of these amounted to a definite diplomatic strategy.

Faced by the outbreak of the crisis, however, Kâmil Pasha was quick to define his priorities. He clearly identified Bulgaria's declaration of independence as an issue more vital from the Empire's point of view than Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was not because the independence issue possessed greater intrinsic importance, but because Kâmil Pasha had long since identified Bulgarian expansionism as one of the principal threats to Ottoman security. He strove to use the crisis to weaken Bulgaria, by attempting to construct alliances with the other Balkan states, by floating the idea of demilitarising Eastern Rumelia, and by demanding financial compensation so large as to cripple Sofia's capacity for military expenditures. At the back of his mind was the conviction that a war with Bulgaria was inevitable, though not immediately: the Empire needed some three years to prepare.

In sum, Kâmil Pasha pursued a diplomacy of limited aims. He sought to contain the crisis, to forestall potentially hostile demands that other Powers and the Balkan states might make, and to enhance the Empire's long-term security against Bulgaria. In contrast, the CUP's approach to the annexation crisis appears to have been both more ambitious and more hesitant. Unlike Kâmil Pasha, the CUP did talk of alliances, with Austria-Hungary, on the one hand, and with Britain and France, on the other.210 It also seems likely that the CUP entertained some hopes of a formal alliance with Bulgaria. However, the fact that all these options were explored indiscriminately, and almost simultaneously, is an indication that the CUP was never finally able to make up its mind as to the diplomatic strategy it should follow. It is possible to attribute this hesitancy to the CUP's anti-Europeanism, and also to its lack of any strong preference for any of the Powers. But it is also possible to discern other factors behind the CUP's unsuccessful excursions into

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